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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to examine the association between corporate governance and the propensity of auditor switching. In particular, the study 
seeks to investigate whether board independence and Chairman - Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality, influence the auditor-client realignment 
exercise. Understanding the reasons why companies switch auditor is very important as auditor switching could inhibit the flow of capital in the 
securities markets, and subsequently, increase the capital costs. Based on the analysis of 712 non-financial companies listed on Bursa Malaysia during 
the period from 31st December, 2009 to 2011, the results suggest that the companies with higher non-executive directors than the sample median tend 
to switch auditor. The Chairman-CEO duality, however, has no effect on the decision. The results also suggest that the provision of non-audit service, 
changes in key management, company size and Big 4 are significant determinants of auditor switch decision. The outcome of the study indicates the 
importance of sound governance on auditor switch decision and might provide insightful knowledge which helps shareholders to realize the importance 
of having balance BODs.
Keywords: Auditor Switch, Audit Market, Auditor Change, Corporate Governance, Malaysia 
JEL Classifications: M41, M43, M49
1. INTRODUCTION
In the middle of year 2002, Andersen, one of the top five audit firms 
in the world, was convicted of obstruction of justice for shredding 
documents related to the failed US energy giant, Enron. Andersen 
ceased its business in August 2002, and its business was acquired 
by other firms. The demise of Andersen and the collapse of Enron 
have ignited intense debate regarding audit market competition and 
audit quality. Although the US Supreme Court reversed Andersen’s 
conviction in 2005, the audit market environment and structure 
had already changed. New legislation and corporate governance 
codes were proposed and introduced worldwide. The main focus 
was on improving corporate governance, which also includes the 
issue of auditor choice.
The issue of auditor choice is not straightforward. According to 
Abdel-Khalik (2002), the biggest fallacy in corporate governance 
today is the premise that shareholders elect and appoint the auditor, 
when, in fact, shareholders (through proxy votes) have effectively 
handed over the control of auditor-related decisions (hiring, 
retention and compensation) to management. Therefore, the real 
motivation for auditor-client re-alignment might be known only 
to management.
Generally, evidence suggests that auditor switches could diminish 
users’ confidence in the audited financial statements which further 
could inhibit the flow of capital in the securities markets and 
subsequently increased capital costs (Knapp and Elikai, 1988). 
Despite the importance of understanding the motivations for, or 
determinants of, auditor switch, little has been done to investigate 
the issue, particularly in emerging market such as Malaysia.
In Malaysia, studies on auditor switch can be considered scarce. 
The most recent studies; Nazri et al. (2012a) and Nazri et al. 
(2012b) recommended that a study should be conducted on 
corporate governance characteristics such as board independence 
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and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality, so as to shed more 
light on this particular subject. Other prior Malaysian’s studies 
(e.g. Ismail et al., 2008; Joher et al., 2000) also do not address 
whether the auditor-client realignment decision is a function of 
company’s corporate governance practices. The present study 
extends the auditor switch studies by examining the possible 
influence of internal corporate governance mechanisms on auditor 
switch decision. Thus, the purpose of this study is to provide an 
answer to this research question: What is the association between 
corporate governance and auditor switching decision?
Given how important corporate governance is in recent years and 
the recent reforms in the corporate governance code, the study 
hopes that more valuable findings could be revealed to help enrich 
the level of corporate governance agenda. The paper is organized 
as follows. The next section discusses prior relevant studies and 
outlines the development of hypotheses. Section 3 outlines the 
research methods and Section 4 presents the results of the study. 
Section 5 concludes the study.
2. PRIOR STUDIES AND HYPOTHESES
Most prior studies on the auditor switch or change decision 
in Malaysia have examined auditor switch determinants such 
as change in management, audit opinion, client size (Nazri 
et al. 2012a; Ismail et al., 2008). However, studies on corporate 
governance characteristics such as board independence, CEO 
duality, are still lacking. Nazri et al. (2012a), investigated auditor 
choice issues, covering 18 years dataset period (1990-2008). 
The authors recommended that a study should be conducted on 
corporate governance characteristics so as to shed more light on 
this particular subject, and to include other variables that could 
affect the auditor choice decision such as audit opinion, audit fees 
and client firm size. Similarly, Nazri et al. (2012b) investigate the 
factors influencing auditor switch. However, despite the findings 
providing invaluable evidence on the issue of auditor switch in 
the country, they still recommended a replication of their study 
with other determinants of auditor switch such as: Audit tenure, 
Non-audit services, board independence, auditor-client relationship 
and CEO duality. Ismail et al. (2008) cover the period from 1997 to 
1998. The study examined major determinants of auditor switch; 
however, corporate governance variables were not examined in the 
study as determinants of auditor switch. Joher et al. (2000) cover 
a relatively old dataset (1986-1996). While providing invaluable 
evidence about the auditor switch issue, the study focuses mainly 
on how the switch could trigger market reaction.
2.1. Hypothesis 1: Board Independence
The distribution of power among corporate managers, shareholders 
and directors is set when shareholders nominate a board of 
directors to represent and protect their interest (O’Neill et al., 
1998). A major role of a company’s board is its control function, 
which includes monitoring top management actions to ensure that 
executives fulfill their responsibilities to the company (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983).
It is believed that the effectiveness of the board in monitoring 
the decisions of managers is often associated with its 
composition. Board composition refers to the distribution of 
members according to their primary allegiance, which may be 
either to the shareholders (outside) or to the managers (inside). 
Outside directors generally are viewed as professional referees 
who unbiasedly protect the shareholders’ interests, helping 
to prevent or detect any management opportunistic behavior 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). Non-executive directors (NEDs) who 
are independent from management could limit the opportunity 
of the board to become “an instrument of top management” 
by serving to limit top management’s discretionary decisions 
(Beasley and Petroni, 2001). Thus, the larger the proportion 
of independent NEDs on the board, the more effective it will 
be in monitoring managerial opportunism (Fama and Jensen, 
1983).
Empirical studies (e.g., Dechow et al., 1996) have shown that 
when boards of directors are more independent, they tend to 
act in the best interests of shareholders. NEDs are expected to 
place a greater emphasis (than executive directors) on the extent 
and quality of the audit rather than on its cost, thereby seeking 
to reduce informational asymmetries between themselves and 
inside (executive) directors (Beasley and Petroni, 2001). The 
presence of NEDs is expected to increase auditor independence 
since the external auditor is able to discuss matters arising from 
the audit process with NEDs free from managerial influence. 
The development of audit committees has further enhanced the 
role of NEDs in this respect. In light of the above arguments, 
it is expected that, in the event of auditor change, companies 
with a greater proportion of NEDs on the board would provide 
a better monitoring on the management action. Given the bad 
effects of auditor change on users’ perception, the company 
with better directors’ independence will be less likely to change 
auditor.
H1: Board of directors’ independence is negatively associated 
with auditor switch.
2.2. Hypothesis 2: The Existence of a Dominant 
Personality (Duality)
Besides the composition of outside directors on the board, the 
separation of the roles of the chairman of the board and the CEO 
can also affect the independence of the board. The Cadbury Report 
and the Combined Code in the UK suggest that the roles of the 
chairman and CEO should be separated. A separate chairman, 
who is more likely to monitor the interests of the shareholders, 
can countervail CEO power. Whenever the same person acts as 
both chairman and CEO (i.e., duality), the CEO will have greater 
stature and political influence over board members and this has 
the potential to undermine the independence of the board (Jubb, 
2000). As the duality implies influence by an insider on the board, 
then it can be expected that auditor change would be more likely 
in the presence of chairman and CEO duality than in its absence. 
In light of the above discussion, it is expected that the presence of 
a dual chairman/CEO is positively associated with the propensity 
to switch auditor.
H2: The presence of a dual chairman/CEO is positively associated 
with auditor switch.
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3. METHODS
3.1. Sample Selection
Initial annual listings of all companies were obtained from 
the official list of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia, as on 
31st December of 2007-2011. This source contains comprehensive 
entries of all companies and securities listed on the main market 
or ACE market (prior to 2010, the list includes Second Board 
and MESDAQ market). As extracted from Datastream on 
2nd September, 2015, 763 companies were continuously listed on 
Bursa Malaysia from the period of 2007 to 2011. 25 companies 
were excluded from the total population due to incomplete data 
(annual report not available). Furthermore, 26 companies were 
similarly excluded since the said companies changed auditor more 
than once during that period. The total sample size became 712 
companies, which included 191 auditor-changed companies, and 
521 non-auditor changed companies.
3.2. Model Estimation
The logistic model to estimate the auditor switch was developed to 
include potential determinant variables. The estimation is as below.
P (audswch=1)=f (nedbod, dual, nas, nasaudfee, mgtchg, levtdta, 
sizeasset, growth, lgaud fee, opinion and big4).
Where;
 audswch=The estimated conditional probability of auditor 
switch and the dependable variables are:
 nedbod=A proxy for BODs independence. Equal “1” if the 
ratio of NED on BODs equal or higher than the sample 
median, “0” otherwise
 dual=Equals ‘1’ if the chairman is also the MD/CEO during 
the year preceding auditor switch or ‘0’ otherwise.
 nas=Equal ‘1’ if NAS provided to client is higher the sample 
median or ‘0’ otherwise.
 nasaudfee=A proxy auditor independence as measured by the 
ratio of non-audit services fee paid to the auditor to the total 
audit fee during the year of auditor switch.
 mgtchg=Equals ‘1’ if the company had change managing 
director or CEO during the year of auditor switch or ‘0’ 
otherwise.
 levtdta=Total debt/total assets.
 lgsizeasset=Natural log of total assets.
 growth=Percentage change in sales.
 lgaud fee=Natural log of audit fee paid to auditor fee during 
the year of auditor change.
 opinion=A qualified opinion indicator variable, coded ‘1’ if 
the company was issued with qualified audit opinion during 
the year of auditor switch or ‘0’ otherwise.
 big4=Equals ‘1’ if the company’s auditor was a big4 during 
the year preceding auditor switch or ‘0’ otherwise.
4. RESULTS
4.1. Descriptive Analysis
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of variables that influenced 
auditor switch decision in Malaysia. The result is presented in terms 
of mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum 
values of each construct. As can be seen from the Table 1, auditor 
change switch has a mean value of 0.2683, indicating 26.83% of 
the sample had switched auditor during the period.
With regards to nedbod, 44.04% of the companies were found to 
have number of NEDs more than the sample median. For duality, 
1 is labeled if the chairman is also the CEO during the preceding 
year of auditor change, then 0 otherwise. The statistics suggests 
that 17.13% of the companies were run by the CEOS, who was 
also the chairman. In respect to nas, the mean, median and standard 
deviation value is 0.5183, 1 and 0.5000. Minimum value is 0 while 
the maximum value is 1. In terms of nasaudfee, the mean value 
indicates 0.8572; median value indicates 0.09, while standard 
deviation value is 15.8386. It shows a minimum value of −0.24 
while the maximum value indicates 422.68.
For management change (mgtchg) variable, it equals 1 if the 
company had changed managing director or CEO during the 
year preceding auditor change or 0 if otherwise. The mean value 
indicates close to 9% of companies had changed their CEO. 
Leverage (levtdta) has a mean value of 57.0734, median value of 
31.575 and a standard deviation value of 264.3675. Meanwhile, 
the assets mean, median and standard deviation value, after 
transformation, is 5.5402, 5.46 and 0.7390 respectively. The 
minimum value reports 3.41 while the maximum value is 8.53. 
Growth indicates a mean value of 37.67014, median value of 
6.87 and standard deviation value of 721.904. For audit fee, the 
mean, median and standard deviation value are 2.1230, 2.05 and 
0.4476 respectively; while the minimum value is 0.6 and maximum 
value is 4.2.
The Table 1 also reports that 2.5% of the sample companies were 
issued with qualified audit opinion during the year of auditor 
switch. The results also suggest that 55% of the companies were 
audited by Big 4, i.e., PWC, EY, KPMG and deloitte.
4.2. Model Estimation
Table 2 presents the results for the auditor switch model. Based 
on the results of this study, board independence is significant at 
the P = 0.072. The finding is contradicted to H1. This suggests 
that the greater the percentage of independent board members, the 
more likely a company will change auditor. This is possibly due 
to demand by independent directors for the company to change 
Table 1: Results of descriptive statistics
Variables Mean Median Standard 
deviation
Min Max
audswch 0.2683 0.00 0.4434 0 1
nedbod 0.4404 0.43 0.1248 0 1
dual 0.1713 0.00 0.3771 0 1
nas 0.5183 1.00 0.5000 0 1
nasaudfee 0.8572 0.09 15.8386 −0.24 422.68
mgtchg 0.0899 0.00 0.2862 0 1
levtdta 57.0734 31.575 264.3675 −3441.55 5146.49
lgsizeasset 5.5402 5.46 0.7390 3.41 8.53
growth 37.6701 6.87 721.9040 −100 19210.54
lgaud_fee 2.1230 2.05 0.4476 0.60 4.20
opinion 0.0253 0.00 0.1571 0 1
big4 0.5548 1.00 0.4973 0 1
Abidin, et al.: The Association between Corporate Governance and Auditor Switching Decision
International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues | Vol 6 • Special Issue (S7) • 201680
to a higher quality auditor. Another explanation is that the change 
was initiated to avoid auditor’s familiarity threat.
However, CEO duality was found to be not significant. This 
finding does not support H
2
 which stated that the presence of dual 
chairman/CEO is positively associated with auditor change. The 
result supports the findings of O’Sullivan (2000), which revealed 
that there is no significant relationship between the two variables. 
Hence, in respect to the above assertion, a company that is being 
run by a chairman who is also the CEO does not seem to influence 
auditor change decision.
Other significant determinants include a change in management, 
size and brand name auditor. The findings document a P = 0.077, 
indicating that management changes could influence auditor switch 
decision. The result is consistent with the findings of Nazri et al. 
(2012a). The study also documents a strong association between 
size and auditor change decision. This finding is supported by prior 
studies such as Nazri et al. (2012b), Ismail et al. (2008), Hudaib 
and Cooke (2005) and Huson et al. (2000). Additionally, the 
brand name auditor (i.e., Big 4) was also found to be a significant 
determinant, indicating a negative association between the two 
variables. A company seems less likely to switch auditor if its 
current auditor is one of the Big 4.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The research objective of the study is to investigate the impact of 
corporate governance on auditor switch decision. In particular, the 
study investigates the association between board independence, 
duality and the propensity to switch auditor. Based on a sample 
size of 712 non-financial companies, the results suggest board 
independence as one of the determinant factors of auditor switch. 
Other significant determinants include the provision of non-audit 
service, changes in management, size and Big 4. The outcome of 
the study indicates the impact of sound governance on auditor 
switch decision and might provide insightful knowledge which 
helps shareholders to realize the importance of having balance 
BODs. The study recommends that future studies should include 
additional corporate governance variables such as the effectiveness 
of audit committee, management ownership and ownership 
concentration. Lastly, a longer period of years could be covered 
to have a true reflection on the issue.
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